Diebold: Why even pretend to tabulate election results correctly?
Issue: Manipulation technique found in the Diebold central tabulator — 1,000 of these systems are in place, and they count up to two million votes at a time.
By entering a 2-digit code in a hidden location, a second set of votes is created. This set of votes can be changed, so that it no longer matches the correct votes. The voting system will then read the totals from the bogus vote set. It takes only seconds to change the votes, and to date not a single location in the U.S. has implemented security measures to fully mitigate the risks.
This program is not “stupidity” or sloppiness. It was designed and tested over a series of a dozen version adjustments.
And:
Findings: The GEMS central tabulator program is incorrectly designed and highly vulnerable to fraud. Election results can be changed in a matter of seconds. Part of the program we examined appears to be designed with election tampering in mind. [emphasis mine] We have also learned that election officials maintain inadequate controls over access to the central tabulator. We need to beef up procedures to mitigate risks.
2 Responses
Great find! There is a great article about a competing Diebold voting system that is very unique and well thought of.
I found it in the Sept. edition of Business 2.0 check it out.
I read this article too. Very interesting system that guy had. Seems almost foolproof. I sure hope the Diebold doesn’t get the contract.